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When introducing or using information and communications technologies (ICTs) in 
elections, electoral management bodies (EMBs) usually need to assure themselves and 
other stakeholders that a given technical solution is going to work—that is, that it 
fulfils legislated requirements, is secure and trustworthy, is of high quality, and will 
perform as expected. 
Certification of ICTs for use in elections is often seen as an option for EMBs seeking 
to provide this kind of assurance. However, certification practice varies greatly between 
countries and EMBs. Some do not conduct any kind of certification, while others use 
very distinct processes with vast differences in scope. Further complicating matters 
is the fact that certification terminology is badly defined and applied inconsistently. 
Moreover, as there is currently no global technical standard for the various ICTs used 
in electoral processes it is usually up to the individual EMB to develop requirements 
for the certification process and assure compliance. 
This publication provides guidance on what the certification of ICTs for elections 
can and cannot achieve, outlines the relationship between the legal and technical 
requirements for certification, and presents a quality-assurance framework that 
summarizes best practices for planning and implementing certification.
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Information and communication technologies play a critical role in the 
administration and organization of modern elections. Any breakdown of 
an election technology, security breach or programming error can incur 
tremendous cost for the electoral management body (EMB)—and may 
undermine voters’ trust, reduce voter participation or even cause national 
unrest. Not all of these problems are avoidable, but in most cases, good 
quality control can significantly reduce the likelihood that they will occur.
This publication is a guide on how best to achieve quality control in election 
technologies, such as electronic voting or tabulation systems. The key elements 
of quality control are certification and evaluation. Certification refers to the 
confirmation of proof of compliance with a given standard. Evaluation is 
the most labour intensive part of the quality control process, during which 
the requirements, designs, hardware, firmware, software, networks and 
operational contexts are examined for faults. Elections technology can only 
be certified by third-party reviewers who are accredited to assess compliance 
with a standard. 
An EMB should consider quality control early in the process of introducing 
new technologies, starting during the feasibility study, especially if it is bound 
by law to provide such a certification. The evaluation reports and related 
documents can also be used to increase transparency of the election, improve 
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Introduction
About this guide
Technology is used in elections to achieve two objectives: (1) to ensure that all 
information produced during the electoral process, particularly the election 
results and the electoral roll, is correct and trustworthy and (2) to generate 
broad acceptance that the electoral outcome is a true and fair representation 
of the citizens’ will. 
The use of technology in elections is growing. Computers increasingly 
perform many tasks that were previously undertaken by humans. Election 
technologies are not standard, off-the-shelf software systems; they are 
usually complex solutions customized to the specific needs of each electoral 
management body (EMB). Since elections represent a country’s individual 
constitutional and democratic culture, they have their own distinct regulatory 
frameworks, focuses and voting procedures. Thus election technologies are 
(and will always be) context specific.
When introducing or operating critical information and communications 
technologies (ICTs) in elections, EMBs must usually assure themselves and 
other stakeholders that a given technical solution fulfils national legislated 
requirements, is secure and trustworthy, is of high quality, and will avoid 
failures and perform as expected. 
Certification of technologies, such as electronic voting or tabulation systems 
is often seen as an option for providing this assurance. Certification practice 
varies greatly between countries and EMBs; some do not do any, while others 
use very distinct processes with vast differences in scope. The process is made 
more complex by the fact that the related terminology is not well defined. 
Expectations as to what certification can achieve, and assumptions about the 
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resources required for certification, are often not realistic. Most importantly, 
certification can not, on its own, create democracy or trust in the process. 
• Certification will not automatically confirm that the electoral process 
is ‘in line with international standards for elections’ or conducted 
‘according to best practice’. The integrity of elections and the resulting 
democracy depends on much more than technically certifying 
equipment and processes. 
• It is not a means of importing democracy, and it should not be used as 
an argument to reject criticism of the electoral process or the technology 
used.
• It is not a quick solution to establish trust in the chosen election 
technology. Certification is a complex process that usually involves 
devoting considerable time and resources in addition to satisfying 
detailed technical requirements. While some of these requirements 
can be derived from legal frameworks or international obligations 
and standards, there are currently no comprehensive, globally agreed 
technical specifications for election technology.
However, certification can assure national and international stakeholders that 
an election technology has been thoroughly and independently examined. It 
can also ensure compliance with a quality management system to maintain 
certification, including the implementation of continuous monitoring and 
improvement plans. The detailed scrutiny that is part of the certification 
process can lead to the discovery of shortcomings that may otherwise 
have remained undetected. A clear understanding of the requirements for 
certification, and a public announcement that these requirements have been 
met, can increase public confidence in the election outcomes. 
Since using a certified system reduces the risk of technology failure on 
election day, the certification process provides additional assurance that 
systems will work as planned. Moreover, certification can give vendors clear 
requirements for developing systems. If such requirements are formulated at a 
national or even international level, it is easier for vendors to provide exactly 
the systems needed. If vendors can get their products certified on the basis of 
meeting these requirements, it becomes easier to market these products in the 
jurisdictions for which the certification is valid.
This Guide aims to help stakeholders better understand the significance of 
certifying election technologies, what certification can and cannot deliver, 
and how it can be conducted and communicated.







How to use this guide
This guide is designed to assist EMBs in designing a sustainable quality control 
process and planning for the process of reaching certified compliance with a 
given standard. It also aims to help EMBs and other interested stakeholders 
such as non-governmental organizations assess how to use the outputs of this 
process (such as evaluation reports) to create transparency in the electoral 
process.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of what certification means and what it 
provides, and helps to dispel common myths about certification. Chapter 3 
introduces the electoral cycle and identifies technologies and processes that 
could be targeted for certification. Chapter 4 describes the Quality Assurance 
Framework in detail, which was written to help guide EMBs and other 
stakeholders through the necessary steps of certification and evaluation tasks.
Chapter 5 outlines the relationship between legal and technical requirements—
understanding these is necessary for a successful certification. Chapter 6 
describes a host of issues regarding the allocation of resources, and discusses 
ways to use the different outputs of the certification process to make the 
electoral process more transparent.
Finally, the case studies in Annex A summarize efforts to certify and evaluate 
election technologies in a number of countries, while Annex B contains an 
overview of relevant standards and describes an approach to help precisely 
express and communicate the separation of duties.
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Why Certify (or Not)?
Criticism or excuses?
The utility of certification processes is often questioned during the 
implementation of election technologies. The following are examples of such 
criticism.
Certification is only a lot of bureaucracy without added value. Certification 
contributes to the democratic nature of elections and is therefore worth the 
effort. Introducing a full-fledged certification process not only increases the 
transparency of the election technologies under evaluation, it also contributes 
to the division of power and by that to the democratic nature of the election. 
Ideally, a certification process will give (almost) all electoral stakeholders a 
higher level of confidence that the election technologies will:
a) live up to their expectations;
b) be free of obvious mistakes;
c) be documented such that experts and future users can understand and 
operate the technologies properly; and
d) provide an effective means of control to all electoral stakeholders—not 
just the immediate users within the EMB. 
Certification lacks the flexibility needed for an agile IT project. IT projects are 
complex to implement, which makes them prone to delays. Certification 
requires even more time after project completion, and once a system is certified 
there is limited scope for any last-minute changes. However, bottlenecks can 
be overcome by using proper procedures and a legal framework that allows 
necessary updates and changes to the configuration of certified systems. 
Systems developed and completed too late are still unlikely to be certified, 
which is also an indication of the higher risk and lower quality of such last-
minute developments.
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Certification is too expensive. Although a fully-fledged certification process can 
be costly, it is much less expensive than a failed election. Spending money 
on a process that increases transparency and facilitates a better division of 
power is a wise investment. Considering resource limitations, it may still be 
necessary to prioritize critical components for certification.
There is no such thing as an independent third party. Any third-party 
certification body needs to be contracted and paid by the EMB or the system 
vendor, which calls its independence into question. Beyond such financial 
concerns, stakeholder perception will determine which third parties are 
deemed independent enough. For example, international certification bodies 
are considered undue foreign influence in some contexts. Conversely, in a 
politicized context, many qualified domestic institutions may be deemed 
biased; some countries will regard academic institutions and other commercial 
certification bodies as more acceptable. Regardless, it is important that the 
selected body enjoys widespread acceptance among all stakeholders.
Certification takes up too much time in our tight schedule. When implementing 
election technologies, missing a deadline often results in either using an 
unfinished product or postponing its use until the next election. Without 
careful planning and dedicating enough time to project implementation, 
successful usage of election technologies is hard to achieve. This general 
principle also holds true for certification processes. A properly designed 
certification process must include a clearly timed project plan. If there is not 
enough time to properly evaluate and certify the election technologies, other 
areas requiring preparation and overall management may also be falling short.
Certification is no more than rubber-stamping an election. A fear often raised in 
established democracies is that certification procedures merely rubber-stamp 
certain election technologies and the electoral process they are used in. It is 
true that some certifications can be superficial, and fail to add real quality 
assurance to the certified system. To ensure that certification provides real 
value, it is best to develop an understanding of what a given certificate covers, 
and how it was obtained. 
Certification is an insider business anyway. In some industries, the relationships 
between vendors, evaluation and certification bodies are very close and not 
regulated by a strict code of conduct. In the area of elections, the general public 
and the media have a high level of interest in all parts of the electoral process. 
To ensure that this interest does not become corrupted, all parties involved in 
the certification of election technologies must adhere to a strict separation of 
power and codes of conduct. The task of the regulatory framework is to avoid 
any situation in which accusations of insider business would be able to fall on 
fruitful grounds. 








Certification is not applicable to ‘our’ kind of election technology. The certification 
of election technologies originally stems from the use of electronic voting 
machines: a single machine would be evaluated and then certified. The 
vendor would then issue a statement of compliance that all similarly produced 
machines would meet the same criteria as the evaluated machine. EMBs that 
use a different form of election technology—Internet voting in particular— 
argue that their systems consist of a single unit, and hence certification would 
be pointless. 
Our country is too small for certification. Establishing a functional infrastructure 
for certifying election technologies requires additional expertise within a 
country. In particular, essential parts of the certification process—such 
as drafting and defining specifications and requirements or issuing the 
certificate—should be performed by domestic experts. This does not mean 
that other stakeholders or international experts cannot support the process. If 
enough time and resources are dedicated, any electoral context can develop 
the expertise needed to conduct a quality certification process.
One cannot be sure the running system is the one that was certified. The guarantee 
that the election technology in use is the one that has been certified has to rely 
mainly on organizational measures. Recent research in this area is intended 
to make this an issue of the past, but it will take considerably more time. 
Certification might fail. If certification fails, it can be assumed to do so for good 
reasons. Rather than perceiving this issue as criticism, detecting shortcomings 
of election technology ahead of their use should be seen as protecting 
democratic principles. It is best to have an established law or guidelines that 
address the possibility of such a failure. This protocol should be made public 
ahead of the elections in order to avoid any surprises or unwanted complaints 
and criticisms if a failure occurs. 
Should election technologies be certified?
Discussions about introducing election technologies usually include how 
to ensure that the technology delivers the required functionalities; this is 
particularly true when transitioning from paper-based systems to electronic 
ones, because one cannot see, touch or feel bits and bytes. Many call for 
certification to solve this ‘black box’ problem, but most of the time it is 
unclear what this certification should entail. Notions of certification mainly 
encompass an evaluation of the technology in question by a competent external 
actor, which in turn will build trust in the election technology. Further aims 
are to be inclusive (include opinions other than the ones responsible for the 
system), build a secure system (by being reviewed by experts in the field) 
and provide accountability (that the technology performs as planned). As 
a result, certification becomes the do-it-all answer to all kinds of concerns 
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related to the introduction of election technologies. Further reasons to carry 
out certification can include a legal requirement or the need to verify the 
correctness of an election outcome.
All of these approaches involve third-party involvement. Such involvement 
can be grouped into three categories:
1. Expert opinion: statement by a highly regarded external person or company 
about a system’s properties. This is the most flexible category, and the 
opinion is valued by the contracting authorities or the general public. 
Such documents are relatively free in format, and their conclusions 
should be interpreted in the context of the author’s background. The 
definition of an expert is subjective and relative, and one expert’s 
findings can always be contradicted by those of another.
2. Review (or assessment, audit, evaluation, inspection, testing, verification): 
the process of verification by competent and independent bodies to 
determine the extent or level of assurance or fulfilment of particular 
properties. These typically analyse the election technology against a set 
of requirements that is defined and/or prescribed by the contracting 
authority, recent academic literature, relevant legal documents and/or 
international standards. The methods by which these reviews check 
the system against these specifications are flexible, as is the associated 
reporting. Rather than a yes/no decision, indicating whether the 
system complies with the requirements, reviews (usually conducted by 
independent third parties) assess the vulnerabilities and associated risks. 
3. Certification: a systematic process (carried out by an accredited 
third party) to evaluate whether a given election technology satisfies 
systematically established standards and/or legal requirements. This 
process may include hardware and software, as well as operational 
systems, management processes and personnel. Both the requirements 
and the evaluation are derived or conducted systematically. In addition 
to a report, a certificate attests to the achievement of compliance with 
required standards.  
Australia: When the Australian state of Victoria launched an end-to-end verifiable kiosk-
based voting system called vVote in 2011, different developer teams initially reviewed each 
other’s code. In March 2014 a third-party evaluator, the DemTech Group, evaluated the entire 
system. In an effort to create transparency, the evaluation report was published on the 
Victoria Electoral Commission’s (VEC’s) homepage, accompanied by a detailed response 
from the VEC. No certification was sought by the VEC. 
For more details about this case see Annex A.
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Expert opinion No No Yes Report
Review Yes No Yes Report
Certification Yes Yes No 
(or very limited)
Report/certificate
While certification might be the end goal of many efforts to evaluate compliance, 
it is also the most complex and time consuming. Where limited resources are 
available, reviews might be more appropriate, even though they do not deliver 
the same level of assurance regarding the quality of the system in question. 
Other coping mechanisms might be to limit certification to the most critical 
parts of the system analysed, which still helps improve its overall quality.
Other reasons for reduced or different kinds of approaches to certification can 
be very complex systems that would be very hard to document and analyse, 
or just-in-time systems designed to answer concrete needs within a short 
timeframe. In such cases, individual processes might be preferred, although 
comprehensive approaches should remain an intermediate goal.
Certification might not be necessary for all IT systems used in an election, 
in particular when they are used for non-critical elements such as managing 
meetings and their minutes, and other transparent and easily approachable 
election technology modules.
All of these efforts should be clearly differentiated from domestic or 
international election observation activities. Election observers are usually 
active for several months to a couple of weeks before election day and stay for 
a few days to several weeks afterwards. Election observers look at the whole 
electoral context in which an election takes place, including, but also going 
far beyond, the technologies and processes that are subject to certification. 
Election observers cannot be perceived as equivalent to a certification, or 
even as providing a structured review of election technologies. Nevertheless, 
observers will be very interested in learning from those involved in reviews or 
certification, and will assess their findings.1
This Guide focuses on a framework for review and certification, and provides 
guidance on designing a process for third-party analysis of a given election 
technology. It aims to support EMBs in their decisions and help others 
understand and contribute to such efforts.
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Risks
Examining election technologies—especially in conflicted contexts, or where 
there is a lack of trust in the electoral authorities—can become a crucial part 
of preparing for elections. This focus, in turn, can put a lot of pressure on a 
certification process, during which weaknesses, vulnerabilities and problems 
might be identified that need to be fixed before the technology can be used. 
Problems can also occur in the certification process that have little to do 
with the technology itself. For example, certification takes time (which may 
be scarce), and if a vendor is inexperienced in writing documentation in a 
suitable format, this can cause delays. The overall complexity of the election 
technology can create additional problems within the process that have 
nothing to do with faults in the product. Limited communication processes, 
such as closed-door policies and the provision of only passive information to 
the public, may also contribute to rumours and unhappiness among some 
electoral stakeholders. 
Vendors and even certification bodies can also create artificial hurdles in 
this process by requiring the persons conducting the review/certification to 
sign very restrictive non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). While NDAs are a 
standard prerequisite to prevent others from disclosing business secrets, they 
violate the democratic ideals of providing transparency and accountability to 
all electoral stakeholders, including the general public. NDAs can produce 
a consequent need to keep documents related to the evaluation procedures 
secret, which can create distrust. An acceptable balance should be found 
between transparency and protecting the vendor’s intellectual property rights 
and system security protocols, since both are essential elements of the process. 
Austria: In Austria, the final evaluation report of the certification of an internet voting 
system was not made public, and representatives of parties could review it on only one day 
in a dedicated room. This led to heavy public criticism of the process. 
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What Can Be Certified
Components of the electoral cycle
Elections are best described using the electoral cycle approach. Figure 3.1 
depicts the three main phases of the electoral cycle.
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At the beginning of a certification process, the questions are always the 
same. How can the EMB be sure that an election technology can be safely 
deployed? How can it take responsibility for technology and processes? The 
technology and the surrounding processes will be subject to public scrutiny 
and validation; they cannot be considered in isolation. For example, all safety-
critical systems come with a set of (digital) keys that must be generated and 
administered. Since these processes include humans as well as technology, 
any quality assurance measures will need to include technology as well as the 
related administrative processes.
Quality assurance methodologies can increase the confidence of all stakeholders, 
for example, through extensive testing, third-party evaluation, gradual roll-
out to only a small fraction of the electorate or simple redundancy measures, 
such as alternative voting channels or printed poll books. As EMBs have 
increased their ability to use ICT, many have created their own information 
technology (IT) departments, with best practices emerging as regards quality 
assurance. International standards help harmonize the technical specifications 
of products and services, and provide assurances about their quality.
Given the complex nature of election technology, the quality assurance process 
needs to evaluate a combination of operational procedures and technical 
designs to determine the risk of weaknesses in operational practice and ICT 
controls. Vulnerabilities in any systems or components can compromise the 
trustworthiness of the security mechanisms that rely upon them, and should 
be highlighted during the quality assurance process.
It is important to note that quality assurance methods will lead to an 
improvement of technology and processes, but it is unreasonable to assume 
that these methods will uncover all weaknesses or guarantee perfection. The 
quality assurance process relies on several assumptions (for example, that 
access controls are strictly regulated and implemented, or that a computer’s 
hardware is not compromised) that need to be true in order for a system to 
work correctly.
Technologies
Election technologies run on computers that may be connected through 
private or public networks such as the Internet. Each computer consists of 
hardware, firmware, an operating system and the election software. 
Firmware is programme code stored within the read-only memory (ROM) 
of a computing device that enables other software programs to run on it. It 
is programmed during the manufacturing process, and may be updated by a 
user or adversary. Firmware is usually developed by the original manufacturer 
and occasionally by independent companies. Manufacturers often release 
updates to firmware to fix bugs, patch vulnerabilities and support new 









hardware. Unauthorized modification of the basic input/output system 
(BIOS) firmware system by malicious software presents a significant risk, 
given its fundamental role within the computer architecture.
Hardware comprises all of the electronic components of any computer, both 
internal and external. Its functions are divided into four main aspects of data 
handling: input, processing, output and storage. External hardware devices 
connected to the computer are usually called peripherals. Peripheral devices 
include input devices (such as a keyboard or mouse), output devices (such as 
printers and scanners), storage devices and communication devices. 
The software provides the instructions that tell the computer to perform a 
specific task and prescribe how it is to be done. The two main categories of 
software are the operating system that runs the computer and controls all of its 
operations and the application software that allows users to perform specific 
tasks on the computer. The operating system has three main functions: 
(a) manage the computer’s resources (central processing unit, memory, disk 
drivers and peripherals), (b) establish a user interface, and (c) execute and 
provide services for application software. Application software can be applied 
to perform a task or to solve a particular problem. EMBs usually invest in a 
mix of custom-developed election software that is specifically tailored to their 
needs and standard task-oriented software packages.
Election technologies can either be stand alone (a computer system or device 
that is used in a small-scale context, plus devices that are connected only 
to that system, and do not share information resources with any other 
system or device) or interconnected (a system that is connected to other IT 
systems in order to share information and resources). Any component of an 
interconnected system, when not appropriately protected, may compromise 
its integrity. All of these technologies are embedded in organizational and 
administrative processes, which involve commissioners, election officials, poll 
workers, voters and other stakeholders. 
Throughout all phases of the electoral cycle
Processes
Contingency plan
The contingency or continuity plan is a list of contingency measures and 
policies to ensure the continuous operation of the electronic election system 
in case of delay, breakdown, failure or ‘disasters’. As with most automated 
systems, there is usually a legally mandated system wherein the EMB is 
required to develop—and, in the case of trigger points, operationalize—the 
continuity plan to cover possible risks in the overall system. Since this system 
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usually involves a fail-safe mechanism that is activated by predetermined 
triggers, the certifier must ensure that the plan adequately addresses critical 
areas. However, the political nature of elections, and the concomitant 
activation of a new process, will require transparency and broad acceptance 
of various stakeholders in order to avoid any semblance of bias or mistrust. 
Thus processes for transparency such as the publication of contingency plans, 
and the involvement of competing parties early on and upon activation, are 
necessary. Elements subject to quality assurance measures may include the 
document describing the strategy, the process and the overall testing of the 
fail-safe mechanisms, such as generators, battery packs, extra machines or the 
presence of ready support.
Internal auditing mechanism 
Election technologies require a built-in audit mechanism to determine early 
on the accuracy of results in the critical stages of the system. In certain 
jurisdictions, a parallel or random audit is conducted to ensure that the 
whole system functions accurately. Any error or discrepancy usually results 
in a root-cause analysis, and, if warranted, the activation of the fail-safe plan. 
Transparency is one of the most important criteria in audits, whether done 
internally or through third parties. The range or scope of audits should likewise 
fall within acceptable sampling methods. Auditing mechanisms should be 
verifiable and produce accurate results in a timely manner. Other criteria may 
include the integrity, security and auditability of the chosen process.
Technology components
Vote service portals
Vote service portals provide voters and candidates with a variety of election-
related information, including about candidates, parties, voting eligibility 
and election results. Since the correctness of the information on such portals 
is crucial for the success of the electoral process, the software should be subject 
to review, in particular for load balancing and as part of stress tests.
Electoral administration systems
The electoral administration system is the essential information management 
tool for the whole electoral process. Ideally it includes all forms of electoral 
information, from calling the election through to the swearing-in of the 
new government. Due to the system’s sensitive nature, and to avoid errors, 
end-to-end (E2E) testing is crucial for the integrity of the election. Further 
assessments should include an analysis of how vulnerable the system is to 
risks such as cyber attacks. 




This is a process to create constituency boundaries following previously 
established patterns that may rely on geographical data, population data, 
other social features (for example, ethnic/linguistic/religious composition 
and history) and electoral data (for example, proportional or majority 
representation, appropriate number of seats). Updates are needed on a regular 
basis, particularly for majority systems, and such modifications may raise 
political concerns of boundary biases (gerrymandering). Several aspects must 
be taken into account in order to ensure a fair distribution of electoral districts, 
including representativeness/non-discrimination, transparency, equality of 
voting strength and stability. Due to the political nature of the boundaries, 
external review is desirable in order to ensure unbiased decisions, but this may 
be difficult to achieve.
Electoral education
Electoral education aims to enhance the overall awareness and skills related to 
electoral procedures. It consists of voter education, training for poll workers, 
and similar activities for other stakeholders (for example, media, political 
parties and civil society).
Registration of political parties and candidate nomination
Legal regulations and relevant procedures determine how to decide which 
entities are eligible to be political parties. These regulations affect public 
rights (for example, funding) and duties (for example, transparency and 
internal democracy). Candidate nomination takes place shortly before an 
election, and can either be linked to previously registered political parties 
or allow independent candidates. A formal declaration of candidates for a 
given election is needed, and should be published according to a clear time 
schedule. The advance publication of candidate names can help to show that 
no bias or manipulation has taken place. 
Oversight of media coverage
Legal regulations may establish temporal (that is, quotas) and substantial 
(that is, neutrality) limitations for electoral media coverage, with the aim 
of guaranteeing a fair electoral campaign period. Such rules may apply to 
both private and public broadcast stations and the printed media. Democratic 
elections need an overall balanced and pluralistic media framework. External 
monitoring and review can provide additional transparency for an electoral 
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Election logistics
Election logistics include operational processes for a public service that needs 
to be delivered within an extremely short period of time. Since there is no 
room for delays or mistakes, logistics become crucial. Examples include 
planning how to produce, maintain, distribute and use electoral material; 
human resources management; budgeting, procurement, communications, 
training and evaluation strategies.
Oversight of campaign financing
EMBs are often responsible for monitoring how political parties spend and 
receive funds from public and private sources. Such funds may apply to 
campaign activities as well as to regular party functions (for example, human 
resources, premises). The legal framework specifies detailed guidelines, 
limitations and relevant sanctions to ensure transparency about the ways 
in which candidates and parties fund their campaigns, and respective 
expenditures are examined. IT systems can be used to make this data public.
Technology components
Voter registration
The voter registration process aims to build an electoral roll that includes all 
people entitled to vote in a given jurisdiction. Voter registration can either 
be conducted on an ongoing permanent basis, or only for specific elections. 
Passive (automatic) or active (on-demand) approaches can be used. Data 
privacy issues need to be considered when creating and maintaining the 
electoral register. Specific voting channels (for example, Internet voting) may 
need supplementary voter registration steps. 
The voter list must be frozen at a specific point in time before election day, and 
a public entity should be responsible for establishing the final list. Citizens 
and other stakeholders overlooked by the law may request amendments. In 





Voter authentication on election day can be supported by additional election 
technologies such as biometric fingerprint readers and/or electronic poll 
books, which help track the participation of individual voters in the election. 
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Biometric technologies help to verify the identity of a particular voter as well 
as their access to a designated voting centre.
Electronic voting machines
Electronic voting machines were the first election technology to be certified 
and for which related concepts have been developed. While it is generally 
considered to be necessary to certify them, formal requirements are still 
lacking and have to be drafted for each context of use. There is a general 
consensus that voting machines without voter-verifiable paper audit trails 
(VVPATs) have much higher certification requirements than machines with 
VVPATs. 
Internet voting
Technologies that allow individuals to cast their vote via the Internet are 
the most challenging and complicated election technologies to evaluate and 
certify. Due to the Internet’s technical properties, assumptions about the 
operating context need to be carefully evaluated in order to realize a high 
level of security.
Ballot scanners
The least complicated voting technology is used for vote casting or counting 
of paper ballots. Ballot scanners provide a means of reconciling the number of 
votes cast on paper with the number of votes tallied by the electronic system 
counting them. The built-in paper trail makes these systems easier to verify 
than electronic voting machines. Nevertheless, certifying ballot scanners, 
including considerations about recognition failure rates, is significant for the 




Individual voters’ data must be protected. This data includes electronic ballots 
that need to be prevented from being accessed past a certain period after the 
electoral results have been determined, and may stipulate disaster recovery. 
Different jurisdictions may require separate data retention policies for electronic 
and paper data. Depending on the electoral process and the corresponding 
election technologies used, there will be a system for safekeeping, storing 
and archiving the physical or paper resources used in the election process. 
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for storing and safeguarding electronic data, including the hardware and 
software for data storage as well as physical security of data storage areas.
Technology components
Result transmission system
Electronic transmission in the context of automated election systems conveys 
data in electronic form from one location to another. The electronic results 
can be generated by voting devices such as voting machines or Internet voting 
systems, or be entered manually at a polling station. A centralized system 
then consolidates the results, and depends on them having been correctly 
transmitted. Therefore the transmission of results at all levels should be 
reviewed during the certification process.
Tabulation system
The tabulation system aggregates the results and assigns mandates according 
to legally defined and often complex procedures and formulas. Such systems 
should be reviewed for accuracy and correct implementation of the related 
legal framework.
Netherlands: At the request of the EMB, a third-party testing company was contracted to 
assess the result tabulation and seat allocation software against its technical specifications 
and requirements. Academic experts assessed the legal correctness of the technical 
specifications. 
For more details about this case see Annex A.
Publication of results 
In the final step of any election, the results are published on the election 
portal, together with information that helps the stakeholders understand 
the final results. These systems are often integrated into public election 
information websites. Due to the public’s high interest in timely results, it is 
important to stress test result publication systems to make sure the system is 
able to withstand high demand access and to make sure that the presented 
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Quality Assurance Framework
At first glance, it seems that certifying election technologies is similar to 
certification processes in other sectors and industries. Yet there are significant 
differences that make the certification of election technologies more complex.
Certification in many sectors builds on existing, well-defined national or 
international technical standards that reflect applicable legal requirements. 
Such standards are developed for large markets by international or regional 
standardization bodies with well-established procedures. Moreover, such 
standards are finalized and stable long before a certification process starts, 
and even longer before a certified system is used for the first time. It is also 
clear what the competent certification body is for each standard.
USA: The United States Election Assistance Commission does not test electronic voting and 
counting equipment systems itself, but provides accreditation to testing labs (voting system 
test laboratories or VSTLs) that evaluate voting systems, voting devices and software 
against the voluntary voting system guidelines to determine whether they provide all of the 
basic required functionality, accessibility and security capabilities. 
For more details about this case see Annex A.
In general, certification cycles are long and the target dates can change. If 
there are delays, the worst that can happen is that a product will take longer 
to enter the market. If standards and requirements change, existing systems 
are not expected to comply at once; transitional periods often span several 
years.
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Certifying election technologies
For elections, the situation is entirely different. Election dates are fixed, 
and all election technologies must be available and operational by a specific 
date. There is no standardization body to develop international technical 
standards for election technologies; each EMB must develop its own 
applicable standards and requirements and assure compliance. Developing 
standards and requirements must take national and international legal 
frameworks into account that are often not designed to provide technical 
guidance, which makes it hard to derive clear technical requirements against 
which a certification can be conducted. The International Organization for 
Standardization published ISO/TS 17582:2014 for electoral organizations, 
however this relates primarily to quality management rather than product 
certification.
To help EMBs plan and implement certification processes, this section 
describes a quality assurance framework that summarizes best practices. It can 
be used to certify election technologies and render them more transparent.
The framework
This section presents the Quality Assurance Framework, which provides a 
comprehensive overview of the steps that may be performed when assessing 
the quality of the election technology components of the electoral process. The 
electoral process consists of several steps, as discussed in Chapter 3, including 
voter registration, party registration, electoral logistics, vote counting and tools 
to provide initial results to the media. All such activities—organizational or 
electoral, with and without ICT support— can undergo quality assessment. 










Figure 4.1: Overview of the Quality Assurance Framework for election 
technologies
The framework, as depicted in Figure 4.1, describes the different phases 
and their deliverables. EMBs may find this framework useful for planning 
a quality assurance process and estimating the kinds of resources needed to 
complete it. 
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The discussion that follows refers to the part of the electoral process to be 
evaluated as the election technologies. It is assumed that precise requirements 
and system design documents are available. The Quality Assurance Framework 
is a methodology designed to evaluate an election technology system in a 
sequence of phases:
1. feasibility;






Definition: The feasibility phase involves identification of the general scope 
of the quality assurance process and determination of the legal, financial, 
scheduling and technical feasibility. Quality assurance mechanisms can, if 
used correctly, detect errors at early stages, and thus improve the quality of 
the election technology.
Activities
• Legal feasibility: The conduct of elections is generally regulated by laws 
and acts, which might influence the certification process. For example, 
legal regulations might determine the procurement of evaluation and 
certification bodies, which in turn might impact on other parameters. 
The feasibility study should verify that there is no conflict of interest.
• Financial feasibility: EMBs’ financial resources are limited. Since 
evaluating and certifying different aspects of the election technology 
might become cost intensive, cost-benefit analysis should be an integral 
part of this phase.
• Scheduling feasibility: The certification process may be time consuming. 
The feasibility study should take into consideration legally prescribed 
time frames, the time needed for decision-making, the time until the 
next election, and how the certification process should be regularly 
conducted to ensure timely completion.
• Technical (operational, infrastructure) feasibility: The EMB evaluates 
whether its operational and infrastructure capabilities satisfy the 
minimum requirements for the quality assurance process.
Resources: The EMB or a designated technical advisory committee is 
responsible for managing this process.
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Output: The feasibility report should indicate scheduling constraints, legal 
and technical requirements, and available financial resources.
Division and selection phase
Definition: The division and selection phase defines the overall target of 
the evaluation and divides it into the parts, processes and components to be 
evaluated. The target may be the entire election technology system or elements 
of it, such as the process of staffing a polling place, or the component that 
implements the user interface or cryptographic protocol. The objective of this 
phase is to decide how to divide the overall system design into components—
which may include protocols, hardware, software and processes—and select 
those that will be evaluated. 
Activities
• Divide into technology components: Election technology systems are 
usually complex and need to be evaluated from different perspectives. 
An Internet voting system, for example, contains communication 
mechanisms that should be analysed in terms of its security, and a user 
interface that should be analysed with regards to usability. Some voting 
systems provide mechanisms for individual and universal verifiability, 
and their reliability depends on voters checking their cryptographic 
receipts. Another example is a digital voter registration system that is 
used to cross voters off the electoral roll after voting. Voter registration 
systems must be easy to use, and should be designed to easily recover 
from unforeseen problems such as system failures. 
• Select technology components: Taking into account the results of the 
feasibility study, EMBs should prioritize the system elements to be 
evaluated. It is in an EMB’s interest to allocate resources in a way that 
maximizes quality assurance. For example, the EMB could prioritize 
components that are mission critical and/or have specific legal 
requirements.
Resources: During the division and selection phase, the EMB identifies 
specific components to be evaluated.
Output: A list of precisely described and documented components to evaluate.
Definition phase
Definition: Based on the results of the previous phase, the definition phase 
identifies the component requirements, defines the operational context 
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Activities
• Define component requirements: The EMB derives requirements based 
on the results of the feasibility study and according to best practices 
and expert advice. It should also consider (and be aligned with) 
requirements for interdependent components. 
• Define operational context: The EMB identifies the assumptions and 
unique circumstances of the election settings. For instance, evaluating 
an election communication infrastructure that utilizes multiple 
relay steps—such as from central headquarters to regional offices, 
an area office, the electoral district and the local voting station. This 
evaluation process requires more resources than a flat communication 
infrastructure that allows direct information flow and control from the 
central EMB to local electoral offices, because it has more failure points.
• Define evaluation method: The EMB reviews suitable evaluation 
methods, and defines new ones if necessary. These might include well-
established methods, for example as outlined by the Common Criteria 
Protection Profiles, ISO 9001 or country-specific standards.
• Define level of detail and time frame: The EMB defines the scope of the 
evaluation, indicating the level of detail at which it is to be conducted. 
During this phase, it should also specify the deadline for completion. 
Resources: During the definition phase, the EMB is responsible for specifying 
the evaluation tasks.
Output: The requirements against which components are to be evaluated, 
the specifications of operational context in which components will be used, 
the choice of an evaluation method, as well as the specification of evaluation 
requirements in terms of the level of detail and time frame.
Evaluation phase
Definition: The certifying agent or body, using the parameters set and 
the assumptions agreed upon, systematically determines the degree of 
compliance with the standards and scope defined. If the evaluation identifies 
any problems, this phase may be used to conduct corrective actions. 
Activities
• Prepare evaluation: The EMB initiates operational meetings, introduces 
key personnel and coordinates task assignment. 
• Define communication plan: The EMB and the evaluator agree 
on a communication plan that includes the establishment of a 
communication structure, alternative means of communication and 
escalation procedures.
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• Evaluation execution: The evaluator produces the designated output as 
stated in the scope of work. 
• Resolve problems: If the evaluator finds issues or irregularities during the 
evaluation, it is the EMB’s responsibility to fix these problems, which 
may entail making changes to the component under evaluation.
Resources: This phase is a joint effort between the EMB and the evaluators.
• Evaluators: Prior to the evaluation phase, suitable evaluators need to be 
identified and recruited. 
• Management: As part of resource management, it is important to 
agree on the terms of the evaluation in advance. Based on the results 
gathered during the definition phase, the contract with the evaluators 
must precisely define expectations and time requirements, as well as the 
provision of documents and deliverables (such as evaluation reports). 
The evaluator must closely and regularly coordinate with the EMB 
during this phase. 
Output: There are two major outputs at this stage: progress reports and final 
reports. The progress reports describe the findings to date, and may suggest 
corrective measures. The schedule for submitting progress reports should be 
agreed prior to the evaluation phase. The final report’s details summarize 
relevant findings, corrective measures and recommendations. 
Review phase
Definition: This step is used to revisit the findings documented in the reports 
produced during the evaluation phase. This phase is optional: it will not 
evaluate components, but rather check the evaluation reports for consistency 
and quality. Reviews resulting from this phase are not to be confused with 
the term ‘review’ introduced in Chapter 2.
Activities
• Conduct quality control: The EMB creates a quality control team 
responsible for reviewing the reports from the previous phase. The 
team must submit a report confirming that all evaluation activities were 
adequately completed. 
Resources: The quality control team responsible for the review phase is 
usually comprised of third-party reviewers. The team may also involve quality 
assurance reviewers who reassess the initial findings of the evaluators.
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Consolidation phase
Definition: The consolidation phase combines the findings of the individual 
evaluation reports to create a single quality assurance document.
Activities
• Report consolidation: All output reports from the previous evaluation 
phase are merged into one unified document that communicates the 
result of the overall quality assurance process.
Resources: The EMB is responsible for assigning external resources to 
complete this process.
Output: The output of this phase is a consolidated report, which can be 
used to prove compliance with specific standards in order to issue a formal 
certificate.
Summary of the quality assurance process
The Quality Assurance Framework provides EMBs with a means to evaluate 
election technology within a specific operational context. Depending on the 
evaluation methods utilized and the resulting evaluation reports, individual 
components may comply with specific standards, in which case accredited 
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Deriving Requirements
From legal to technical
Constitutional law is usually the expression of a country’s culture and identity. 
Consequently, election regulations differ from one country to another, and 
they are always enshrined in constitutional and basic laws. In principle, 
such normative requirements—both the high-level concept and the detailed 
format—provide guidance for conducting elections throughout the electoral 
cycle. For certification purposes, this framework can be considered the legal 
requirements.
When constructing and evaluating election technologies (and their 
components and processes), the legal requirements have to be transformed 
into technical requirements the certifier can use for the evaluation. 
Switzerland: Each canton using electronic voting needs to get approval from the Federal 
Chancellery. This approval is based on tests in the given context monitored by the Chancellery. 
For more details about this case see Annex A.
Translation into technical requirements
Determining technical requirements requires close cooperation and dialogue 
between legal and technical experts. While technical requirements may 
need to identify the context in which they are to be implemented, legal 
requirements may also be shaped, nuanced and weighted when deployed. 
Therefore, understanding legal ductility is essential for developing proper 
technical requirements.
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Legal ductility: Acceptable margin of appreciation when determining the meaning of legal 
terms.
Legal latitude: Method of providing a fair solution when contradictory principles apply to 
a given case.
Legal ductility may apply to at least two different scenarios: legal cultures and 
legal interpretation. 
First, the same legal principles may convey different meanings depending on 
the socio-cultural context in which they are used. Secrecy, for instance, is a 
clear international commitment, but each country may interpret it differently 
(for example, using voting booths is not mandatory everywhere).
Second, the same legal principle may convey different (and even contradictory) 
meanings depending on the means of interpretation, even within the same 
country and with similar socio-cultural patterns. Context-based and result-
oriented interpretations are standardized methodologies of analysing legal 
principles; both help resolve legal discrepancies fairly. Case law also provides 
legal inputs that directly shape the meaning of legal principles.
Contradictory legal principles may be weighted so that the main legal goal 
is achieved even though none of the components of the legal system is fully 
satisfied. Such a legal latitude may take place at a constitutional or legislative 
level (for example, postal voting, individual vs. territorial representation in 
parliament) or in court, but practitioners can also extract the relevant trade-
offs comparing existing legal rules with the needs of a real situation.
Once defined, the legal framework is subject to technical requirements that 
not only further develop it but also constantly reshape its content through 
normative modifications and recurrent case law adaptations. Thus technical 
requirements, which will face several barriers during their implementation, 
also represent important inputs for legal updating. Legal and technical 
issues have mutual interactions that are based on reciprocal, rather than 
unilateral, patterns. Reusing existing technical solutions represents another 
clear example of reciprocal dialogue between the legal and the technical side. 
When translating legal terms into technical requirements, solutions that 
have been implemented in other contexts could be used if they prove to have 
addressed similar problems.
Technical requirements used as a basis for certification are not only derived 
from the current legal framework. They can also incorporate aspects of 
non-domestic legal frameworks or technical requirements that might 
become legislation or serve as particular features of the election technology. 
Incorporating requirements that are out of scope of domestic legislation 










might, for instance, be interesting if certification is to be valid for a longer 
period of time.
Consideration of the context
EMBs should not expect to find a global certification procedure that would 
be valid everywhere. Although some common patterns might be highlighted, 
each country is likely to need tailored certification solutions that will take 
into account its specific socio-political, legal and technical needs. Moreover, 
each electoral jurisdiction represents a context for which the technical 
requirements and overall certification process should be adapted.
The technical requirements of different components and processes might 
not be implemented unconditionally for all application settings. Consider, 
for instance, the evaluation of a cryptographic key distribution scheme. The 
number of entities with which a secret cryptographic key will be shared 
affects the extent to which vote secrecy is enforced, yet it does not impact 
the usability of the voting interface—for this, voters’ technical affinity is 
important, but this does not impact on the degree to which vote secrecy is 
enforced.
Technical analysis can only assess the risks; public authorities need to decide 
which threats and risks are acceptable when conducting elections. Fulfilling 
technical election technology requirements depends on the context of (the 
expected) threat scenario. Here, the concept of the separation of duty is helpful. 
It can be expressed using the so called k-resilience value, which indicates 
how many entities need to be compromised to jeopardize the integrity of the 
election (for more details about k-resilience see Annex B).
Requirement catalogues
When deriving technical requirements, EMBs do not have to start from 
scratch; they can build upon previously established requirement catalogues, 
such as the following.
ISO standards: Several ISO standards capture requirements for election 
systems, for example ISO/TS 17582 quality management systems and 
several common criteria protection profiles. Despite the practical relevance 
of several protection profiles (for example, PP-CIVIS (2006), IEEE (2005), 
Lee et al. (2010), Karokola et al. (2012)), most do not consider verifiability, a 
requirement provisioned by many legal frameworks.
Region-specific requirements: Based on legal provisions, several nations and 
regions have determined sets of individual technical requirements. For 
example, the Council of Europe (CoE) released their Recommendations 
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Rec(2004)11, which covered 51 technical requirements for electronic voting; 
Germany captured requirements for voting machines in the Voting Machine 
Ordinance (1975); France released a legal decree in 2003 (Ministère de 
l’intérieur de la securité intérieure et des libertés locales, 2003); the United 
States of America recently released its Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 
in version 1.1 (EAC 2007); and in 2014 Switzerland specified requirements 
for the conduct of remote electronic voting, including the requirement to 
give voters in some cases the ability to individually or even universally verify 
the vote. Region-specific requirements might be a good way to customize the 
certification process to a particular context. Yet weak local developments may 
not fit international criteria. 
Private associations: A number of private associations have released requirement 
catalogues for running technically supported elections. Both the International 
Association of Cryptologic Research (2015) and the German Gesellschaft für 
Informatik (2005) have developed a list of technical requirements for remote 
electronic voting. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers has 
developed a standard for voting equipment, with the goal of facilitating the 
data flows and election processes of technically supported elections. While 
these technically driven approaches are certainly a good starting point, their 
implementation might find unexpected barriers due to a lack of realism or 
context failures.
Research literature: The scientific community has also addressed the 
challenge of deriving technical requirements for electronic voting. Yet the 
research literature might not always be a complete solution. Technical 
academic papers are often tailored toward fine-grained interpretations of 
technical requirements, perhaps neglecting other requirements: for example 
cryptographic schemes that deploy coercion resistance as a strong form of vote 
secrecy without considering usability. In such cases, research papers would 
essentially serve as aids rather than requirements catalogues. However, some 
academic papers could also set up a complete new requirements package, 
which might help stakeholders implement certification procedures.
Further information about the research literature focusing on the derivation 
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Planning
With the help of the Quality Assurance Framework, it is possible to 
structure the certification process for electoral technologies. Yet further 
considerations are necessary when implementing such a process. This chapter 
provides guidance on the planning, timing, and overall transparency and 
communication of the certification process. 
Planning the certification process
As with any important activity that needs to be managed properly and 
effectively, prior planning is essential to its success. The following concerns 
should be factored into the certification project plan:
1. selecting the certification body, including the selection criteria;
2. identifying the minimum standards and preferred methodologies (if 
any) to be used;
3. identifying the minimum certification requirements for compliance;
4. identifying the scope of work to be covered by the certification project;
5. estimation of costing or budget for the project, including such detailed 
items as the cost of the certification service, and other incidental and 
operational expenses;
6. identifying manpower requirements for putting together review/
validation teams, especially when consolidating individual certifications 
of different components of an entire system;
7. the time period allowed for the project, especially immovable dates that 
are prescribed by law;
8. scheduling of reporting requirements;
9. transparency or communication strategy, including the level or degree 
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of transparency that will be implemented, which information may be 
disclosed, and how to handle different groups of stakeholders (whether 
critics or active supporters) if there is a failure of certification; and
10.  overall responsibility for the project, including specific identification of 
responsibilities and accountabilities.
Significance of the selection of a certification body
Since only an accredited body can issue a certificate, selecting which persons 
or entities are entitled to conduct certification procedures is a critical step. 
One should consider that, from a layperson’s perspective, the content of the 
reports and the subsequent certificate will be meaningless due to its technical 
profile. Trust will only be enhanced if the certification bodies provide sound 
credentials of their professionalism, and if that guarantee is directly linked to 
the criteria used to select such entities. In short, the selection of certification 
bodies goes far beyond a purely technical decision, and is linked to citizen 
confidence, public interest awareness and the institutional separation of 
powers.
Who is entitled to conduct a certification?
The first requirement is to make public the criteria used to select certification 
bodies. These criteria should be established well in advance, and could be 
submitted to appropriate hearings with relevant stakeholders. The context is 
likely to which criteria are really needed; different scenarios might be foreseen.
For instance, if an overall consensus guides the implementation in a given 
country, EMBs could easily find well-known local and/or international experts. 
Their professional background would be enough in such cases—no further 
formal qualifications would be needed. Standard national or international 
practice should be enough. On the other hand, qualified certification agencies 
could be helpful. The criteria used to determine the nature of a qualified 
certification agency would have to be established by law or by EMBs. Such 
criteria should be objective and independent of discretionary decisions. Self-
certified or self-proclaimed ‘certifiers’ should not be allowed.






Philippines: a committee, independent of the EMB, is mandated by law to certify the 
automated election system (AES) to be used on election day. This certification is to be done 
through an evaluation by an international certification entity (ICE). The list of authorized ICEs 
is provided to the EMB by an advisory council, a body that is created by law and composed 
of representatives from different sectors of society. This council is presumed to have 
knowledge and expertise of ICEs. 
For more details about this case see Annex A.
Who contracts (and pays) the certification body?
Once it is established which persons and/or entities can conduct a certification 
process, the legal framework should determine how to select one or more of 
these bodies. Different scenarios are possible. For example, the selection of 
a given certification body could depend on the vendors themselves. EMBs 
could only use products that have been previously certified by one of the 
accredited certification bodies enlisted to do so. However, this relies on each 
vendor’s preference for which certification body is the most appropriate, 
which may cast doubt on the independence of the certification body.
Alternatively, EMBs might directly lead the certification process. They might 
indicate which certification agency will be in charge of certifying a given 
product, even though the product might have already received previous 
certificates. The same strategy could apply to products that have been 
developed in house or for internal EMB processes.
Who owns the certification? Disclosure agreements
Determining how to validate and confirm the findings of the certifiers is a 
crucial part of the overall certification process. Either the law or the EMB 
should establish clear rules regarding how long the certification is valid, the 
purposes for which it can be used, and the right to access the information or 
documentation generated by the certification process. Such regulations may 
result in conflicts of interest between private commercial rights (for example, 
intellectual property) and democratic needs (for example, citizen oversight 
of an election process). If the certifier is a third party, a body may be created 
to review or validate its findings. If stakeholders are allowed to conduct such 
scrutiny of third-party certifications, they should be required to have a similar 
skill set as the certifiers. 
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France: certification reports are only delivered to the EMBs and the vendor itself. Moreover, 
according to the decisions of the relevant committee (Commission d’accès aux documents 
administratifs, CADA), the right of access to public information does not apply, because 
both intellectual property and the electoral process could be endangered. Court rulings have 
managed to achieve only partial disclosures thus far. 
For more details about this case see Annex A.
If vendors choose and contract the certification body, the vendor will usually 
pay the certification body directly, which may limit the disclosure of the 
certification reports. However, if the EMB contracts the certification body, 
there is likely to be more room for a more open disclosure policy, although 
public administrative rules could be as restrictive as commercial ones. 
Moreover, EMBs could be subjected to legal constraints imposed by the 
vendors to protect their intellectual property rights.
Finland: Finland tested Internet voting in three municipalities and an expert review 
was envisioned, but the proposed non-disclosure agreement (NDA) was not accepted by 
stakeholders including the Electronic Frontier Finland. They claimed that the NDA included 
abusive clauses that limited both the right of access to the relevant documentation and the 
right to publish the final findings. 
For more details about this case see Annex A.
How to deal with discrepancies?
Discrepancies are much more significant in an electoral context than in 
normal certification procedures. ICT election certifications not only aim 
to guarantee technical performance; they also intend to enhance citizen 
confidence. Discrepancies may reveal certain information that could 
be interpreted differently by different stakeholders, depending on their 
perspective. If experts fail to agree in their findings, election technologies that 
lack normal oversight by a layperson require a sound communication strategy 
that enhances overall awareness of the outputs of certification and verification 
procedures and addresses false expectations.
Discrepancies should be defined early in the process, during the planning 
stage, in order to avoid any confusion in the execution stage about whether 
a certain finding by the certifier or a reviewer is considered a discrepancy. 
Discrepancies may be categorized according to their potential impact on the 
electoral process—whether they are critical (enough to be ‘show stoppers’ 
on election day), major (they may have an adverse effect on the conduct of 
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elections if compensating controls are not put in place to address them) or 
minor (they would have no significant effect on election day).
At least three kinds of discrepancies might appear. First, the selection 
procedure might include some doubtful points regarding adherence to the 
parameters that have already been set up. For instance, the professionalism 
of the certification body might be discussed, even within frameworks that 
enjoy high levels of consensus. The credentials might also cause complaints 
if there is a margin of appreciation. Second, certification outputs might be 
controversial if a number of different certification bodies are involved. And 
finally, the relationship between certification and verification may cause 
unexpected problems. Although it is normally conceded that the stages 
covered by an E2E verification do not require previous certifications, it is 
unclear who is responsible for validating that the system is using E2E tools. 
Since that statement (which may not be obvious) also needs to be validated 
(that is to say, certified), discrepancies may easily arise.
Cost considerations
The cost and effort involved in certifying an election technology will vary 
depending on the quality and quantity of components and documentation 
involved, which in turn are dictated by the specific requirements of the body 
contracting the service, whether it is the EMB or the vendor.
The requirements and timeline must be carefully itemized in a request for 
information (RFI) so that prospective certification service providers can 
provide detailed cost estimates. 
For example, if a source code review is to be included in the service, the RFI 
must indicate the number of lines of code to be reviewed. If certain dates are 
prescribed by law, these should be included in the certification requirements. 
In addition, if specific tests are required, these should be listed with particular 
parameters that could impact on the cost. The required tests should be 
described in detail such that both parties would have the same understanding 
of the kind of tests that are required, and be costed accordingly. Where the 
certification process will be carried out (at the service provider or EMB/
vendor’s premises) will also impact on the cost, as will incidental expenses.
It is a good idea to include a checklist of items in the RFI. When responses are 
received, this makes it easier to decide which items can be removed or added 
based on cost limitations.
Aside from the actual cost to be incurred for the services of the provider, 
incidental costs for other related activities should be considered. For example, 
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the findings of the certification service provider, operational expenses for 
this body should also be factored in with computation of total cost to be 
considered.
Norway: A customized open source license enables anybody to access the relevant data 
for non-commercial purposes. However, the Norwegian case reveals another common 
drawback in certification procedures conducted by external parties. Due to the difficulties of 
establishing ongoing pro bono monitoring teams, the Norwegian Government hired external 
experts to conduct the relevant assessments, despite the apparent contradiction with 
maintaining an institutional framework based on neutrality and impartiality. 
For more details about this case see Annex A.
The cost of certification further varies depending on the organizations 
involved, their size and the maturity of their processes and procedures. If an 
EMB decides to implement more than one standard at a time, the number 
of variables and degree of complexity will increase, and hence raise the costs. 
Understanding the objectives and benefits of becoming certified will help an 
organization manage costs and remain compliant with the relevant standards.
Once a system is certified it will be subject to updates and continual 
improvement. This requires regular reviews and audits, and represents an 
additional cost to certification
Time
For certifications to be relevant, the certification process must satisfy the 
following time-based requirements:
1. Certification must be completed pursuant to the legally prescribed time 
frame. Certain jurisdictions have strict legal requirements regarding 
when the certification process should be implemented and the results 
released.
2. Certification reports must be timely—not too early, never late. Decision-
makers and EMBs must be informed in a timely manner of the results 
of certifications to ensure that they are able to implement corrective 
measures (if needed) in time for elections. 
3. The certifier must be able to complete the requirements within a specified 
period. Unlike regular audit reports, the law (if not the constitution) 
prescribes the election period. More often than not, the election date 
cannot be, and is not, postponed. Since many governmental budgetary 
systems rely on multiple layers of bureaucracy, and procurement 
processes are restricted, election technology is usually finalized and 
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purchased later than would be ideal. Therefore the certifying body 
must be able to satisfactorily review the technology within a short, non-
extendable time frame. 
4. Certification must be regularly reviewed and/or refreshed to ensure that 
the different systems used are still effective. Given that certification helps 
project a fair and credible system, it is useful to re-certify for every 
election even if doing so is not legally mandated.
Philippines: The Philippine Automation Law requires the domestic Technical Evaluation 
Committee to certify the automated elections system, including its hardware and software 
components, no later than three months before an election. 
For more details about this case see Annex A.
Transparency and communication
Many countries require elections to be transparent, which includes giving 
all electoral stakeholders access to documentation and other relevant aspects 
of the electoral process. In some countries, citizens have the opportunity to 
check all parts of the electoral process, including observing the counting 
process.
Germany: The Supreme Court decided in 2009 that the electoral law at that time did not 
live up to the requirement of transparency, and banned voting devices that were in use. The 
court highlighted that real transparency is not only formal openness; it also involves citizens’ 
ability to understand the key stages of an election process without specialized knowledge. 
For more details about this case see Annex A.
The election technology certification process and outputs can increase the 
transparency of an election among stakeholders, election officials, polling 
workers, voters and election observers. EMBs can use the outputs from 
different stages of the certification process to convince stakeholders that all 
necessary steps were taken to guarantee an election of the highest standard. 
The outputs may even be used as evidence in court disputes.
Hurdles to transparency
Not all EMBs make the most of these outputs in terms of transparency and 
trust generation, and some choose to keep the outputs confidential. The 
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NDAs demanded by vendors or certification bodies. Some may argue that 
vendor-associated proprietary intellectual property of certain hardware and 
software products should be protected and not be easily available to the 
general public. Some may also argue that the source code of various software 
components should only be made available to third parties subject to the 
signing of a carefully worded NDA. 
Technical information can be misunderstood, and some stakeholders can 
intentionally misinterpret very detailed information. This is a valid concern that 
can be addressed by a clarifying response from the EMB and possibly also 
the vendor. The response should describe remedial actions and correct any 
misrepresentations.
The release of too many details creates new vulnerabilities and undermines the 
system’s integrity. This a common concern, which is not valid. Any attacker 
who is interested in exploiting the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of an 
election technology should be assumed to know these details already.
Kazakhstan: The Sailau electronic voting system was first used in 2004, and it was 
discontinued in 2011. While voting machines were subject to external review, the 
requirements for certification and the final report were not made available to the public. 
For more details about this case see Annex A.
Improving transparency through the outputs generated during the 
preparatory stages of the certification process
Prior to contracting evaluators, reviewers or consolidators, the EMB may 
publish the following information:
• Election settings: The EMB may release information gathered throughout 
the feasibility analysis, including scheduling constraints, legal and 
technical requirements of the overall technology, as well as available 
financial resources.
• Details about component evaluation: The EMB may publish details 
about the process of determining the technical requirements. It may 
also publish information about the evaluation method, including the 
requirements of the evaluation.
• Evaluation service procurement requirements and results: This may 
include publishing the terms of reference, including the identities of 
interested parties, the results of the procurement process and costs. 
Many procurement processes are public in nature.
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Transparency through the outputs generated during the evaluation 
and review phase of the certification process
The EMB may, as part of its quality control process, involve public or 
accredited groups such as political parties, civil society or academic researchers 
and other experts to review the evaluation reports of different components. 
Their reports can be made public prior to consolidating the various other 
documents.
Evaluation reports: During the early stages of the evaluation process, and prior 
to implementing corrective measures, the EMB may release initial evaluation 
reports. It may decide to discuss corrective measures with the end user, and 
may release strategic information revealing which corrective measures have 
been taken, and eventually publish the final evaluation report. 
Reviews: As a further transparency measure, the EMB may decide to publish 
the results of independent reviews.
Belgium: The College of Experts conducts an independent review/evaluation. Additional 
certification is provided through a private certification company accredited by the Belgian 
Government. The college must report its findings to parliament and the Ministry of Interior, 
and these reports are generally published thereafter. No details about the certification by 
the private company are available to external stakeholders. 
For more details about this case see Annex A.
Improving transparency with the final report
The EMB’s response to the results of the certification review should include 
the following information, regardless of whether it is released to selected 
stakeholders or the general public. Since stakeholders have different interests 
in the election technology, the reports may be released with different target 
audiences in mind, such as political parties, non-governmental organizations 
and electoral observers (both domestic and international). This response 
might include both general and specific information about the certification 
process. 
If the election technology was certified, the EMB should explain precisely 
what requirements the system was shown to fulfil. It may also increase 
transparency about other aspects of the election preparation process to 
help build public trust in and acceptance of election technologies. Specific 
information an EMB may want to share might include the selection criteria 
and credentials of the evaluation body and reviewers; requirements against 
which the evaluation was conducted; comments about the evaluation reports; 






48   International IDEA
In addition to releasing different documents and information generated 
throughout the certification process, there are complementary methods of 
ensuring transparency. For example, allowing public review without major 
restrictions helps stakeholders increase their trust in the election technology.
Philippines: Pursuant to the Philippine Automation Law, the Philippine EMB allowed 
accredited parties (including critics and stakeholders) to review the source code to be used 
for the 2016 elections months before the actual polls, alongside the official certification 
evaluation. 
For more details about this case see Annex A.
Another approach to encouraging transparency is for an EMB to launch an 
education campaign explaining the different technologies being subjected to 
certification. This increases public awareness of both the certification process 
and the technology.
Brazil: The EMB organized public tests of the electronic voting system, during which it 
invited computer scientists and interested parties to attempt to find external vulnerabilities 
in the system.
For more details about this case see Annex A.
Venezuela: No certification was deemed necessary, but a source code review process was 
made accessible to interested stakeholders. 
For more details about this case see Annex A.
Summary
The final consolidation report of the certification process should arguably 
be made available to the general public. However, there is also convincing 
evidence that it is beneficial to publish intermediate outputs during each major 
phase of the certification process. Releasing information and documents to 
the general public might increase credibility and public acceptance of the 
entire election process, as long as the system essentially implements the 
proposed requirements. Yet if major flaws and shortcomings are detected in 
the system, this might significantly damage the EMB’s reputation. While 
publishing information and documents throughout the quality assurance 
process requires an EMB to allocate further resources to communicate with 
the general public, doing so will benefit public education and contribute to 
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informed discussion. The EMB may also consider that electoral disputes 
arising during the quality assurance process might need to be taken into 
account and mitigated before the election. Transparency-enhancing measures 
are closely related to the means of communication in place: communicating 
the separation of duties (k-resilience) that prevent single points of failure 
might be one means of ensuring the transparency of the entire election 








This Guide has discussed how the certification of election technologies has 
been approached differently around the world. It offers arguments both in 
favour of and against certification, and introduces the Quality Assurance 
Framework to provide guidance to electoral stakeholders during third-party 
assessments of election technologies. This framework covers planning, time 
and cost considerations, and the communication of results. 
On the basis of this Guide, it can be concluded that:
1. Certification can enhance citizen confidence and election integrity. The 
Quality Assurance Framework helps EMBs plan for the certification 
of election technologies, including measures necessary to achieve 
transparency, international recognition and local acceptance.
2. Certification is complex. The Quality Assurance Framework simplifies 
planning and conducting certification processes.
3. Certification of election technologies is time critical. The Quality 
Assurance Framework helps EMBs integrate certification activities into 
their overall project plan.
4. Certification requires prioritization due to resource limitations. The 
Quality Assurance Framework provides EMBs with guidance on how 
to prioritize certification tasks based on their importance.
5. Certification of election technology is a continuing process. The Quality 
Assurance Framework requires ongoing evaluation and improvement, 
and supports third-party oversight and external review.
6. Certification and election observation are complementary. Certification 
can support (but not replace) electoral observation. Conversely, electoral 
observation cannot be seen as a certification measure.








7. Certification may expose weaknesses. When third-party evaluations 
identify weaknesses, EMBs need to take measures to minimize the 
risks to their trust and credibility.
8. Certification needs to be properly communicated. All certification processes 
should include a communication strategy and an acknowledgment of 
what certification can achieve (as well as its limitations).
9. Certification content and evaluator selection are equally essential. 
Providing third-party evaluators with clear requirements is as crucial 
for a successful certification as their independence and qualifications.
10. Certification needs a context-specific approach. Sociopolitical factors 
and national legislation are important guiding principles for drafting 
requirements for certification.
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Annex A: Case Studies
Australia
New South Wales
The New South Wales Election Commission (NSWEC) procured iVote, an 
online voting system for the 2015 State Elections. The NSWEC does not 
believe that the current maturity of the remote internet voting system market 
is sufficiently advanced to allow effective certification by any organisation. It 
also sees it it as problematic to devise and apply standards when the actual 
requirements for systems are not common across jurisdictions. The NSWEC 
is of a view that each jurisdiction has a different social and political mix and 
different drivers for implementing these systems, hence the concept of standard 
creation will be difficult. Moreover, the standardisation process should not 
focus on the technology components of the system but rather its operation 
and outcomes. The standards which the NSWEC envisages would be most 
effective are those that demonstrate that the system meets or exceeds the 
integrity of current electoral processes and satisfies stakeholder expectations. 
The NSWEC does not believe a standard specific to electronic voting is 
necessary, but rather one which is more akin to quality standards such as 
ISO 9000.
The NSWEC is interested in improving effective transparency for its systems 
but does not believe that necessarily means providing unfettered public 
access to system documentation. The NSWEC is mindful of the overheads 
of increased transparency regimes and believes the public interest is best 
served when the effort to provide transparency is balanced against the added 
confidence these activities give to the electorate.











The state of Victoria in Australia developed an E2E verifiable kiosk-based 
voting system called vVote from 2011 to 2014. vVote was designed and 
implemented by a team from the University of Luxembourg, the University 
of Surrey and Crypto Workshop, plus a group of programmers working for 
the Victorian Electoral Commission (VEC).
The project was launched in 2011, requirements were committed in December 
2012 and the software development process ended in December 2013. The 
developer teams reviewed each other’s code to ensure internal quality control. 
Late in 2013, a tender for a third-party reviewer was organized. In March 2014 
a third-party evaluator, the DemTech Group, evaluated the entire system and 
produced a report that was published on the VEC’s homepage, accompanied 
by a detailed response from the VEC. No certification was sought by the 
VEC. All documents are available from the commission.
The vVote system was piloted during the 2014 Victorian state election, when 
it was open to three groups of voters: those with disabilities, those who 
could not understand English, and residents abroad in London. It collected 
1,121 votes. 
Key features
• A kiosk-based voting system was piloted in 2014; for selected voter 
groups only.
• The pilot system was designed and implemented by the academia with 
the EMB.
• Peer review was conducted for the pilot system.
• Third-party evaluation was organized after the pilot, and the report was 
made public on the EMB website.
Reference
Victorian Electoral Commission, <http://www.vec.vic.gov.au/Voting/
ElectronicVotingDetail.html>, accessed 16 October 2015
Austria
In Austria, a test case for Internet voting was conducted in the area of student 
elections. Austrian student elections are special, as they are regulated by 
federal law and have a high legal value. As part of the Internet voting euphoria 
at the beginning of the millennium, the Austrian Parliament changed the 
relevant law to allow Internet voting as long as two conditions were met: 
(1) identification was done using smart cards with digital signatures and 
(2) the software was certified by the certification authority for digital 
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signatures, A-SIT. In the regulations accompanying the law, the requirements 
for the certification were set by CoE Recommendation Rec(2004)11 and 
relevant protection profiles.
Austria’s first (and, to date, only) use of Internet voting was conducted in 2009. 
The certification process was to be concluded at least 60 days before election 
day. This deadline was kept, but A-SIT defined five operational conditions 
that were to be fulfilled during the vote for the certificate to be valid. This 
essentially meant that A-SIT had to monitor the implementation of the 
election. In addition, it had to re-certify minor changes to the software, for 
which an additional certificate was issued. The final report of the evaluation 
was only made accessible to representatives of the political parties during a 
limited public event, which led to a lot of public criticism. 
Key features
• Internet voting technology was mandated to use CoE Recommendation 
Rec(2004)11 and relevant protection profiles after certification of a test 
case by the certification authority for digital signatures.
• Certification was to be concluded at least 60 days before election day.
• The costs for the evaluation process were paid by the oversight body, the 
Federal Ministry of Science and Research.
• Only the certificate(s) were publicly accessible.
• The final evaluation report was only available to a limited audience.
• The certification authority was assigned by law and is independent and 
competent.
Reference
Krimmer, Robert and Ehringfeld, Andreas and Traxl, Markus, E-Voting bei den 
Hochschülerinnen- und Hochschülerschaftswahlen 2009. Evaluierungsbericht 
(Vienna: Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research, 2010), <http://
www.e-voting.cc/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2015/04/Evaluierung_OeH-
Wahl_E-Voting.pdf>, accessed 15 November 2015 
Belgium
The Belgian E-voting Act was approved in 1994 and two voting systems 
were deployed, covering up to 44 per cent of the electorate. In 2012, one 
of these systems was replaced by a new platform adapted to contemporary 
requirements.
An independent review/evaluation was conducted by the College of Experts, 
and additional certification was provided by a private certification company 
accredited by the Belgian Government. The College of Experts is an expert 
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committee appointed by parliament that evaluates the country’s electronic 
voting technologies. The college begins reviewing the automated voting 
systems 40 days before elections. Members are entitled to request any 
information from technology vendors, including source codes and copies 
of software. They may also visit polling stations, copy software in use on 
election day and conduct other activities. The college must report its findings 
to parliament and the Ministry of Interior within 15 days after elections, and 
reports are generally published thereafter.
In addition, each political party that has at least two members of parliament 
may designate an IT expert to receive the source code of the e-voting systems 
and examine it. While they must keep the source code confidential, it is 
published after the election.
In 2007, federal and regional administrations commissioned a consortium of 
seven Belgian universities to conduct an independent comparative study of 
e-voting systems—known as the BeVoting study—to propose which one best 
fit international standards and the Belgian electoral legislation. The proposal 
included the requirements for the new voting system in such detail that the 
report may serve as a technical appendix to the call for tenders. The CoE also 
evaluated the compliance of the BeVoting Study with its Recommendation 
Rec(2004)11.
Key features
• Requirements were only indirectly derived from legislation: they were 
defined as finding an existing solution that best matches the legislative 
framework.
• Evaluation and certification were conducted independently of each 
other.
• Reports by the College of Experts are publicly accessible. 
• No details about the certification by the private company are available 
to external stakeholders.
References
BeVoting Reports [Part I (comparison and evaluation), Part II (proposals) and 
CoE’s Report], <http://www.elections.fgov.be/fileadmin/user_upload/Elections/
fr/presentation/bevoting-1_gb.pdf>, <http://www.elections.fgov.be/fileadmin/
user_upload/Elections/fr/presentation/bevoting-2_gb.pdf>, accessed August 
2015, <http://www.elections.fgov.be/fileadmin/user_upload/Elections/fr/
presentation/Compliance_Belgian_BeVoting_Rec_1_0_final_18_02_08.pdf>, 
accessed August 2015 
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Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights, ‘Elections in Belgium’, <http://www.osce.org/
odihr/elections/belgium>, accessed 16 October 2015
Vegas González, Carlos, ‘The New Belgian E-voting System’, Electronic Voting 
2012 (Bonn: GesellschaftfürInformatik, 2012), pp. 199–211, <http://www.e-
voting.cc/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/07/199-211_Vegas_Belgian-E-
voting.pdf>, accessed 16 October 2015 
Brazil
Brazil’s EMB, the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), developed electronic 
voting machines that were introduced in 1996 and deployed nationwide 
shortly afterwards. The machines’ apparent simplicity was designed to 
facilitate the transition from a paper-based to a computerized system.
The TSE has final authority over the system’s source code, which has not been 
certified by an outside authority. The legal framework requires the TSE to 
make the final source code available to political parties and the Bar Association 
(Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, OAB) 120 days before an election. After 
2000, in the wake of heightened scrutiny of the system, the TSE began to 
allow outside actors to review the source code, but only a few political parties 
regularly participated in these reviews, and obtained the required expertise 
from affiliated academics or contracted companies. 
The first comprehensive, independent and non-partisan audit of code and 
equipment was conducted several years after the adoption of electronic voting 
in 2001 and 2002 by eight computer scientists at the State University of 
Campina. Since then, the TSE has sponsored a few additional independent 
audits of the code, generally by university researchers. 
The OAB hired an outside company to examine the source codes in 2004. 
Since then only minimal auditing has been conducted due to the high costs 
and a lack of internal capacity. In 2009 and 2012, the TSE organized public 
tests of the system and invited computer scientists and interested parties to 
attempt to find external vulnerabilities in the electronic voting system. The 
first test did not provide access to source code, while the second one did.
Key features
• Brazil is a large country that uses a single e-voting solution nationwide.
• The voting machines were developed by the EMB, which owns the 
source code.
• No formal evaluation or certification process was conducted by the 
EMB.
• The EMB has opened the review to public tests.
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• Some stakeholders were granted access to technical details and could 
conduct assessments at their own expense.
• Assessments were conducted by the OAB as well as political parties that 
in turn relied on academics and contracted companies. 
• The high costs for stakeholders limit the extent to which stakeholders 
can conduct assessments themselves.
References
National Democratic Institute [NDI] and International Federation for Electoral 
Systems [IFES], Implementing and Overseeing Electronic Voting and Counting 
Technologies (Washington, DC: NDI and IFES, 2013), <https://www.ndi.org/
files/Implementing_and_Overseeing_Electronic_Voting_and_Counting_
Technologies.pdf>, accessed 16 October 2015
van de Graaf, Jeroen and Felipe, Ricardo, ‘Uma Analise da Seguranca da Urna 
Electronica Brasileira’, Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 
2003, <https://repositorio.ufsc.br/bitstream/handle/123456789/85004/198467.
pdf?sequence=1>, accessed 16 October 2015
Estonia
Estonia is the only country in the world that provides its citizens in all elections 
with an optional Internet voting channel. A major technical cornerstone is the 
use of digital signatures to identify voters and the use of a hardware security 
module to decrypt the Internet votes for counting.
Neither the law nor the EMB has prescribed the formal external evaluation 
and certification of the system. However, the EMB contracts undisclosed 
experts to provide an opinion on the software but does not disclose the 
requirements, the reports or their authors.
In addition, for each election the EMB hires an audit company to oversee 
the conduct of Internet voting. It checks the conduct against a published 
operation manual. The completeness of the manual is not checked, nor are 
there any deviations from it. The reports are not made public.
Key features
• Expert opinions are given about the source code before the election, 
and a review of the operations is conducted.
• The opinion is conducted before the election and the review of operations 
is conducted during the election. 
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• No reports are made public.
• The EMB developed the requirements (operations manual) for the 
review of operations.
References
Springall, Drew, et al., ‘Security Analysis of the Estonian Internet Voting System’, 
Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications 
Security (Scottsdale: ACM, 2014), <https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/ivoting-
ccs14.pdf>, accessed 16 October 2015
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe/Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights, ‘Elections in Estonia’, <http://www.osce.org/
odihr/elections/estonia>, accessed 16 October 2015
Finland
Finland piloted Internet voting from supervised contexts in 2008. It was a 
limited project that only covered three municipalities—Karkkila, Kauniainen 
and Vihti—during one election. Usability drawbacks were discovered that 
justified the withdrawal of the Internet voting channel.
The Finnish EMB decided to submit the project to external review by an 
academic group, but other stakeholders (for example, Electronic Frontier 
Finland and a computer expert) refused to accept the non-disclosure 
agreement (NDA) proposed by the vendors, and did not participate in the 
review process.
Key features
• This was a limited project that used Internet voting from supervised 
contexts.
• Usability failures led to a Supreme Court ruling that banned this voting 
channel.
• A controversial NDA was used for external evaluations.
References
Aaltonen, Jussi, ‘Electronic Voting Case Law in Finland’, in Ardita Driza Maurer 
and Jordi Barrat (eds.), E-Voting Case Law: A Comparative Analysis (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2015), pp. 173–81
Barrat, Jordi, ‘El voto electrónico ante intereses contradictorios: la razón comercial 
contra el principio democrático. A propósito de los compromisos comerciales 
de confidencialidad (CCC)’, Democracia digital, participación y voto electrónico 
(Valencia: CEPS, 2010), pp. 57–69
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Vähä-Sipilä, Antti, A Report on the Finnish E-Voting Pilot (Helsinki: Electronic 
Frontier Finland, 2009), <http://www.effi.org/system/files?file=FinnishEVoting
CoEComparison_Effi_20080801.pdf>, accessed 20 August 2015
Whitmore, Keith, Information Report on the Electronic Voting in the Finnish 
Municipal Elections Observed on 26 October 2008 (Strasbourg: Congress of 
Local and Regional Authorities, 2008)
France
France uses voting machines as well as Internet voting. Voting machines 
are used by a limited number of municipalities that have to be approved 
in advance by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, while French citizens living 
abroad can use Internet voting to select up to 11 MPs in the Lower Chamber.
Voting machines are approved by the Ministry of Internal Affairs based on 
a certificate issued by a qualified agency. These entities must comply with 
Annex A of regulation EN45004 or an equivalent regulation, and should 
be validated by the French Accreditation Committee (Comité Français 
d’Accréditation) or a similar entity within the European Cooperation for 
Accreditation framework.2
Different suppliers may request to have their voting machines approved, and 
each municipality chooses which vendor will deploy voting machines in each 
local jurisdiction. Municipalities buy the voting machines and take care of 
them. The certification process only covers the machines and the suppliers’ 
internal management procedures, including the information they give to the 
local authorities. It does not cover the security and management standards 
used by local authorities. The vendors are required to provide general 
guidelines to their clients, but the implementation depends largely on the 
local authorities.
Certification reports are not public. Vendors select and pay a certification 
agency, and the reports are only delivered to the EMB and the vendor. Moreover, 
according to a 26 January 2006 recommendation by the Commission d’accès 
aux documents administratifs, an official consultative board, the certification 
reports can be withheld from the public on the grounds that industrial secrecy 
and the proper implementation of the elections could be compromised. 
During the 2007 presidential elections, court decisions managed to partially 
disclose certification reports.
Internet voting follows a different strategy. Audits are carried out by a 
computer professional specialized in security, who has no financial interest 
2 ‘Art. 2.1, Arrêté du 17 Novembre 2003 portant approbation du règlement technique fixant les conditions 
d’agrément des machines à voter’, <http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/content/download/1775/18612/file/
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in the company that produces the voting system, who has experience in the 
analysis of voting systems and who participated in a workshop for experts on 
electronic voting organized by the Commission nationale de l’ informatique 
et des libertés (Paragraph II of article R. 176-3 of the Electoral Code). The 
audit verifies the respect for secrecy, and the reliability and accessibility of the 
vote. It covers the full breadth of the system to be used and the operations 
to be carried out prior to the vote, the use of the voting system during the 
elections, the tally and the storage of data after the vote (Article 2/Arrêté 27 
April 2012).
Subsequent reports have not been published. OSCE/ODIHR (2012:11) 
suggested in 2012 that ‘the internet voting security requirements, as well 
as the methodology and results of security assessments, audit protocols, 
results of all audits performed, the analysed source code, and minutes of all 
proceedings be made available to the general public to enhance confidence in 
the internet voting process’.
Key features
• Two types of election technologies are used: voting machines and 
Internet voting, with different methods of certification:
 - For voting machines, certification is performed by a qualified 
third party selected by the vendors, which pay for the certification 
services. The voting machines are approved by the EMB after the 
certification.
 - For Internet voting, an audit is done by a computer security 
professional who meets specific requirements.
• There is limited disclosure of certification reports for voting machines, 
since these are only delivered to the electoral authorities and to the 
vendor.
• Partial disclosure is allowed due to court rulings.
• Reports are not published for either technology.
References
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Intuitions and Human Rights, ‘Elections in France’, <http://www.osce.org/
odihr/elections/france>, accessed 16 October 2015
Germany
In Germany, electronic voting machines were used in parts of the country, 
and they did not provide for a VVPAT. They were evaluated and certified by 
the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt in Berlin, and only the certificate 
was made public. The evaluation reports remained closed. This was the case 
until in 2009 when the Supreme Court decided—upon an appeal from a 
citizen—that voting machines without a VVPAT should not be used, as 
they do not allow layperson citizens to completely understand the voting and 
counting process, or the ability to see if there have been any manipulations. 
Key features
• In Germany, a single type of voting machine was used in parts of the 
country for federal elections. The machine did not provide a VVPAT.
• A single accreditation body was established by law, which evaluated and 
certified the system according to the legal requirements.
• The evaluation report was not made public.
Reference
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India
After initial pilots were completed with EVMs in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, a parliamentary act introduced e-voting in 1988; nationwide deployment 
was achieved in 2004. The inclusion of paper trail audits has been subject 
to different lawsuits, ending with a Supreme Court ruling in October 2013 
that requires them. VVPAT machines were introduced during Loksabha 
elections-2014 as a pilot in a few states.
The Indian voting machines were devised and designed by an independent 
technical expert committee consisting of a group of professors in computer 
science. The EVMs are manufactured in collaboration with two public sector 
enterprises after a series of meetings, test-checking of the prototypes by the 
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are now produced by these two companies, under the supervision of the 
independent technical expert committee.
While testing does play a role in the work of the EMB, it is done by the 
independent technical expert committee constituted by EMB. Due to increased 
concerns expressed by election stakeholders during the 2009 elections, the 
EMB invited critics to share specific information about perceived or actual 
vulnerabilities in the EVM system. The EMB additionally puts emphasis on 
several security procedures and rituals to prove the accuracy, efficacy and 
neutrality of the system. 
For the 2009 and 2014 parliamentary elections, the usage of the EVMs went 
smoothly. However, the Election Commission of India (ECI) has always 
been interested in independent testing and exploring innovations for future 
elections.
Key features
• Voting machines were devised and designed by an independent 
technical expert committee and manufactured by two public sector 
companies.
• Tests and checks of the prototypes were conducted by the technical 
expert committee. 
• Extensive field trials are conducted.
• Production of the voting machines under supervision of the technical 
expert committee.
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accessed 20 September 2015
Kazakhstan
The Sailau electronic voting system was first used in 2004, and was 
discontinued in 2011. The system was deployed in supervised contexts and 
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consisted of a direct recording electronic machine, which used two devices 
to retrieve and process voting data. Poll books were also integrated into the 
system.
Voting machines were subject to external review. However, the requirements 
for the certification (and the final report) were not made available to the 
public.
Key features
• Voting machines were used from 2004 and discontinued in 2011.
• The requirements for certification and the certification reports were not 
published.
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Netherlands
The EMB (Kiesraad) contracted a private company to develop software for 
nomination of parties and candidates, and to tabulate results and allocate 
seats. An EMB expert group developed a detailed technical specification 
based on the applicable legal framework for this purpose in June 2009. This 
specification was subsequently updated for newer versions of the software, 
most recently in January 2014.
At the request of the EMB, third-party companies were contracted to assess 
the result tabulation and seat allocation software in regards to the following 
two aspects:
• the degree to which the software meets the established specification for 
calculating the result and distributing the seats; and
• the extent to which the software meets the requirements of the electoral 
act.
A first assessment was conducted in February 2011 for the general elections 
in September 2011; a second assessment was done in February 2015 for the 
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legal experts from the University of Utrecht to assess the legal correctness of 
the technical specification.
The EMB takes a highly transparent approach and publishes all requirements, 
assessment reports and system source code on its website.
Key features
• The national EMB provides a software solution.
• The adoption of a system is based on a decision of local election 
administrative bodies.
• The EMB defined technical requirements through an expert group.
• The software was independently assessed against the technical 
requirements.
• The technical requirements were independently assessed against the 
legal framework.
• Assessments were completed approximately one year after the 
requirements were defined and at least three months before election 
day.
Reference 
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Norway
The Norwegian Internet voting project was used in 2011 (for local elections) 
and 2013. It was later stopped due to political reasons. No certification was 
deemed necessary, as the Internet voting procedures were claimed to comply 
with E2E verification. Both supervisions, in conjunction with the disclosure 
of all relevant data concerning Internet voting devices, were deemed to 
provide the same (or higher) degree of confidence as certification. However, 
E2E mechanisms still rely on tasks that can only be conducted by IT experts. 
Therefore, this solution may ease the controls over the voting application and 
allow any interested expert to carry out his/her own verification, but—in 
contrast to what happens with traditional paper-based elections—average 
citizens will still remain excluded and the system is based on proxy trust.
Moreover, E2E verification assumes that an external third party with no 
conflicts of interest will carry out the relevant tasks, but (as the Norwegian 
example shows), that might not happen and the E2E framework may never be 
implemented. Hiring external experts, as the EMB did, somehow contradicts 
E2E’s rationale.
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The Internet voting system implemented in Norway included an auditor 
module for monitoring transactions within the system. It also employed 
several organizations to provide system and security audits. In addition, 
the ministry contracted an independent auditor to check that key stages of 
the vote authentication and counting processes were conducted accurately, 
and that recorded votes were not changed during the cleansing, mixing and 
tallying stages of the process. External evaluation studies were also contracted 
by the EMB, which were designed to cover social and legal issues.
Key features
• Internet voting procedures were claimed to comply with E2E standards.
• No certification process was in place.
• Customized open source licenses enable anybody to access the relevant 
data for non-commercial purposes, including review.
• Despite openness, it was difficult to gather experts to conduct pro bono 
reviews.
• Due to a lack of experts to conduct open reviews, external auditors were 
contracted by the ministry to monitor strategic issues from both IT and 
socio-legal perspectives.
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Philippines
For the 2010 presidential and local elections, the Philippines, with 
approximately 50 million local voters and a sizable number scattered around 
the world, implemented an automated election system (AES). The AES 
covered key aspects of the Philippine electoral process, including preparation 
of election data for the configuration of the ballots, casting of votes on 
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voting machines, electronic tabulation using electronic results, and electronic 
transmission of results to the relevant canvassing levels. 
The Automation Law required that an independent body certify the AES. It 
specifically stated that a Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) composed 
of members of the Department of Science and Technology, the Commission 
on Information and Communications Technology and the Commission 
on Elections (COMELEC) should be formed. Using identified document 
results, and with the support of an international certification entity (ICE), 
the TEC’s primary task was to certify that the system (including its hardware 
and software components) was operating properly, securely, accurately and 
in accordance with the law. They were to do so no later than three months 
before the election.
Another independent body called the Advisory Council was tasked to 
recommend a short-list of established ICEs to support the TEC’s certification. 
The members of the Advisory Council were legally required to be of ‘known 
independence, competence, and probity’ and to come from different sectors 
of the country, including the government sector (ICT, science and technology 
and education ministries) and the private and non-governmental sector (ICT 
professional organizations, non-governmental electoral reform organizations). 
After undergoing government procurement procedures, the Philippine 
EMB contracted an international entity to review the AES. In turn, this 
international entity used the certification test reports summary to audit the 
system’s accuracy, functionality and security controls. After the international 
entity’s review—and based on the requirements and guidelines for AES 
certification embodied in the Philippine Automation Law—the TEC issued 
the corresponding certification. The TEC stated that, in accordance with the 
Automation Law, the AES could, with full adoption of the recommended 
compensating controls, be used securely, accurately and properly by voters, 
boards of election inspectors, local and national boards of canvassers, and 
COMELEC in the 10 May 2010 national and local elections. The source 
code was also held securely at the Philippine Central Bank in accordance 
with the Automation Law.
Thus the 2010 elections were held using a certified automated system. In 
accordance with the Automation Law, a random manual audit with the 
Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting, an accredited citizens’ arm, 
was conducted. 
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Key features
• The EMB was the sole customer purchasing a single solution for 
nationwide use.
• The EMB paid for the AES certification.
• The general requirements and guidelines for AES certification were 
embodied in the Automation Law.
• The AES certification was issued by an independent committee and not 
by the EMB.
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Switzerland
Each canton using electronic voting needs to get approval from the Federal 
Chancellery for it to be introduced, as well as after the expiry of initial 
approval, any ‘significant’ changes in the system, geographical expansion or 
an expanded electorate.
The specification of confederation-wide requirements is defined in 
‘Anforderungskatalog für eidgenössische Volksabstimmungen mit der 
elektronischen Stimmabgabe’. Systems need to comply with domestic (federal 
and cantonal) legislation and relevant international legal obligations—the 
European Convention on Human Rights and International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and CoE Recommendation Rec(2004)11.
Federal Chancellery approval is based on tests monitored by the chancellery 
as well as the provision of detailed documentation. Approval starts six to nine 
months before the election at the latest.
Beyond this approval, there are certification requirements as follows:
• for usage by more than 30 per cent of the electorate, valid certification 
and audit reports need to be provided for individual verifiability;
• for usage by more than 50 per cent of the electorate, complete (individual 
plus universal) verifiability is required;
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Key features
• Cantons decide on the usage of voting technology, which requires 
approval by federal authorities.
• The need for certification depends on the percentage of the electorate 
that may use the system.
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USA
The United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) created voluntary 
voting system guidelines (VVSG), which specify the minimum standards 
applicable to electronic voting. The EAC has developed a comprehensive 
program by testing all voting systems against these guidelines. The EAC 
does not evaluate electronic voting and counting equipment systems itself, 
but accredits testing labs (voting system test laboratories or VSTLs) that 
evaluate voting systems, voting devices and software against the VVSG to 
determine whether they provide all of the required functionality, accessibility, 
and security capabilities. After completing the evaluation phase, the VSTLs 
provide a set of recommendations to the EAC, which upon review of the 
Commission’s executive director determines whether to issue a certification. 
Once an e-voting solution is certified, a system is allowed to bear an EAC 
certificate sticker and can be advertised as having obtained EAC certification.
While the VVSG certification process can be an effective method of ensuring 
the integrity of the e-voting or counting system, electoral bodies must consider 
that the certification process (depending on the number of issues discovered) 
may take approximately 12 months The examination process to certify 
e-voting or counting systems can also be expensive. VVSG certification 
guidelines are designed to comply with US laws, and some aspects of the 
certification process may not be directly applicable to other countries. These 
challenges must be carefully evaluated and balanced with the benefits of 
following such a certification approach. 
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Key features
• A large market with several competing vendors and many local electoral 
administrations that can choose which technology to utilize.
• Domestically developed and maintained federal standards.
• A certification process including evaluation in testing laboratories and 
certification by the federal EMB.
• VVSG establishment of clear technical requirements for vendors.
• Certification allows vendors to market their solutions to different 
electoral administrations.
• States can regulate whether and how to utilize certification and require 
either:
 - no evaluation or certification at all;
 - evaluation against federal standards;
 - evaluation against federal standards by an accredited laboratory; or
 - evaluation against federal standards by an accredited laboratory and 
certification by a federal agency.
• Requirements, evaluation reports and certificates are publicly accessible.
Reference
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Venezuela
Venezuela started using electronic voting machines in 1998 (first scanners 
and later direct recording electronic substitutes), and currently utilizes 
this technology throughout the country. Biometric tools are also being 
implemented. While there is no certification in place, the usage of voting 
machines is subject to detailed scrutiny including a paper trail audit of a large 
percentage of the votes cast.
The source code for the electronic voting machines is reviewed before each 
election. Technical teams assembled by government institutions, independent 
institutions and political parties review the source code line by line in a ‘clean 
room’ where code can be viewed in its entirety but not modified or taken 
away. As part of this review process, the source code is compiled and hash 
values of the final versions are registered. These hash values can then be used 
to verify that the reviewed version of the software is being used on election 











70   International IDEA
Key features
• Source code review process accessible to interested stakeholders.
• No certification or assessments resulting in related reports.
• Limited format of the review prevents a comprehensive assessment. 
• Usage of hash values helps verify that the version that has been reviewed 
is actually in use.
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Overview of relevant standards and available 
specifications
Product certification
CoE Recommendation Rec(2004)11 on legal, operational and technical 
standards for e-voting
CoE certification of e-voting systems: guidelines for developing processes that 
confirm compliance with prescribed requirements and standards, 2011
CoE guidelines on transparency of e-enabled elections, 2011
VVSG 1.1, 2.0: These guidelines (mandated by the Help America Vote Act, 
2002) provide a set of specifications and requirements against which voting 
systems can be tested to determine whether they provide all the required 
functionality, accessibility and security capabilities <http://www.eac.gov/
testing_and_certification/voluntary_voting_system_guidelines.aspx>
Protection profiles
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Common Criteria 
Protection Profile – Basic Set of Security Requirements for Online Voting 
Products, 2008
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Digital Voting Pen, 
Version 1.0.1, 2007
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, P1583 SCC 38, IEEE 
P1583TM/D5.0: Draft Standard for the Evaluation of Voting Equipment, 
2005
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Lee, Kwangwoo, Yunho Lee, Dongho Won and Seungjoo Kim, Protection 
Profile for Secure E-voting Systems, In Information Security, Practice and 
Experience, pp. 386–97, 2010
Ministère de l’intérieur, de la securité intérieure et des libertés locales, 
Règlement technique fixant les conditions d’agrément des machines à voter, 
2003
Quality management
ISO 9001: quality management requirements for an organization to ‘say what 
they do, do what they say’—for example to keep documentation of procedures 
and perform audits to confirm that they follow the documented procedures.
ISO/TS 17582:2014: specifies requirements for the application of ISO 9001 
to electoral organizations at all levels of government.
Security and functional assurance
ISO 15408 Common Criteria is a generic framework that allows computer 
system users to specify their security, functional and assurance requirements. 
Vendors can develop products and claim they meet these criteria. Testing 
laboratories can evaluate the products and determine whether the vendor 
claims are true. Common criteria are often used for critical infrastructure, 
as it provides assurance across the whole spectrum from the specification of 
requirements to product implementation and product evaluation.
ISO 27001 Information Security Management: helps organizations keep information 
assets secure <http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/management-standards/
iso27001.htm>
Expressing and communicating the separation of duties
Whether elections satisfy the relevant technical (and, consequently, legal) 
requirements depends on the operational context. Therefore operational 
requirements must be expressed and communicated precisely in an 
understandable manner—particularly when new technologies are introduced, 
because the complexity and interference of trust distributions with regard to 
different requirements significantly increases. The notion of k-resilience values 
(Volkamer and Grimm 2009) is one means of expressing trust distributions. 
In abstract terms, k-resilience values describe which entities involved in 
the election process are capable of ensuring the enforcement of specific 
requirements. 
For example, from a regulatory perspective, polling station guidelines often 
require the application of the ‘four-eyes principle’ to tally votes. The accuracy 





of the tallying process can then be ensured if at least one out of two poll 
workers operates honestly. Accordingly, the polling station arrangement is 
1–of–2 resilient (it can resist the dishonesty of one of the two poll workers). 
A technical example is a remote electronic voting system that uses 
cryptographic protocols to ensure vote secrecy. Several cryptographic keys 
may be distributed among a number of trustees to ensure the secrecy of the 
vote. In this case, if at least one out of all the trustees behaves honestly, the 
secrecy of the vote can be ensured. If the keys are, for example, distributed 
among five trustees, the system would be considered 1–of–5 resilient (it can 
resist the dishonesty of four trustees).
K-resilience values not only apply to specific components of a system but 
can also be propagated to other parts. For instance, in a voting software 
development process, the k-resilience value expresses which vendors provide 
the voting system and which provide the verification system. If the same 
vendor provides both systems, then the accuracy of the tallying process can 
be ensured if one out of one vendor behaves honestly. This would be expressed 
as 1-of-1 resilience—the lowest resilience value, which indicates a possible 
single point of failure. The k-resilience value could be improved to 1–of–2 
resilience if different vendors supply the voting and verification systems.
Capturing the enforcement of requirements in terms of k-resilience values 
with regard to different components provides a precise and understandable 
means of specifying the operational context. Additionally, k-resilience values 
might serve as a basis for communication between the EMB and stakeholders 
involved in the election, including the general public.
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Glossary
Accreditation: a formal and independent confirmation of the competence of 
a certification body, which is issued by a duly authorized entity
Artefact: a verifiable product of human workmanship or skill, with neither age 
nor tangibility being an element thereof <http://plj.upd.edu.ph/constructing-
the-past-legal-documents-as-historical-artifacts/>
Assessment: appraisal or evaluation of a system
Audit: systematic and independent examination of a system through 
obtaining and evaluating evidence that ensures the system fulfils pre-defined 
requirements; the result is a report providing third-party assurance to 
stakeholders
Biometric: refers to metrics related to human characteristics, such as 
fingerprints, hand, face, signature, voice, iris or retina
BIOS (‘basic input/output system’): the basic software of a personal computer 
that ensures it can start up
Certification: a systematic process by an accredited body to evaluate whether 
a given election technology (which may include hardware, software, operation 
systems, management processes and personnel) satisfies previously established 
standards and/or legal requirements.
Certification body: an organization or company with established and 
verifiable competence to issue certifications, either by legal appointment or 
by formal accreditation according to an agreed standard




Configuration: a set of parameters that customize the settings of a computer 
programme, operating system or election equipment
Decryption: the process of using cryptographic methods on an encrypted 
computer file to make it readable (see also Encryption)
Discrepancy: a finding in a review process that indicates a deviation of 
the system under review from a defined standard against which it is being 
measured
Encryption: the process of using cryptographic methods on a computer file 
to make it unreadable to unauthorized users (related to Decryption)
End to end (E2E): IT processes that are run sequentially from beginning to 
end, used especially for systems with more than one component wherein the 
execution has to be performed from the end of one to the end of another
Evaluation: a key part of the overall certification process; a detailed and 
systematic review of the defined election technology based on set parameters
Fail-safe mechanisms: mechanisms to ensure that if a system part fails, the 
system responds in a way that will not cause harm to others
Feasibility study: an assessment of the practicality of a proposed project to 
objectively determine its strengths and weaknesses; there are several types, 
such as technical, economic, operational or schedule feasibility
Firmware: software that is written to the ROM of a computing device and 
used to run user programs on the device
Formal methods: techniques used to model complex systems as mathematical 
entities. By building a mathematically rigorous model of a complex system, it 
is possible to verify the system’s properties in a more thorough fashion than 
by empirical testing <http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~koopman/des_s99/formal_
methods/>
Hash value: a numeric value of a fixed length, which is computed using a hash 
function that uniquely identifies data; it is a useful tool for the examination, 
discovery and authentication of electronic evidence
Hashing method: an irreversible (one-way) function that allows users to 
unequivocally identify a message or file
Intellectual property: the legally recognized exclusive rights to creations of 
the mind
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k-resilience: a means of expressing trust distributions to assess which entities 
can ensure the enforcement of specific requirements; a system is k-resilient 
with respect to a particular security objective if at least k entities need to 
operate honestly in order to achieve the security objective 
Legal ductility: acceptable margin of appreciation when determining the 
meaning of legal terms
Legal latitude: a method of providing a fair solution when contradictory 
principles apply to a given case
Malapportionment: inequality arising from the unfair distribution of 
representatives per electoral district
Operating system: software that forms the essential base for managing the 
resources provided by computer hardware and software, and the management 
of computer programmes that ‘sit on top of it’
Plebiscite: direct democracy procedure by which the citizenry of a given 
country expresses popular opinion on substantial topics or the continuity of 
political representatives
Proclamation of results: the official announcement of final election results
Proxy: an agent that acts on behalf of someone else
Requirements: a complete and detailed listing of functionalities, qualities or 
performance criteria that a system must comply with, which must be written 
in a clear, consistent, correct, feasible and verifiable manner, and which must 
not be open to multiple interpretations; these can be derived from standards, 
legal obligations originating in applicable national and international 
legislation, and specific objectives of the end user and other stakeholders
Review: used interchangeably with the terms ‘evaluation’ and ‘verification’ to 
refer to the process of validating compliance or conformity of the subject item 
for certification against a pre-defined set of standards
Source code: human-readable machine instructions that tell a computer 
system what processes and functions to perform and how to behave in 
specifically defined situations
Standard: a document that provides the minimum set of guidelines or 
characteristics that materials, products, processes and services are measured 
against to ensure their appropriateness for their intended purpose; they can be 
developed by national or international standards organizations, or formally 
set internally by a body for implementation and compliance purposes
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Stress test: a test for reliability and stability, which tries to find the limits of 
a given system
System design document: a detailed written description of a system
Tabulation of votes: aggregating votes from various sources in a systematic 
manner
Tally: alternative term for tabulation of votes
Testing/Inspection: an investigation conducted to provide stakeholders with 
information about the quality of a (software) system. Testing can provide an 
objective, independent view of the system to allow stakeholders to appreciate 
and understand related risks. Test techniques include running a system to 
identify any deficiencies
Third-party certifier: an organization that is independent of the parties 
involved in the system, such as the developer, vendor and the EMB
User acceptance test (UAT): a type of testing on a system that is executed 
by its end user, which has to formally rate the system as ‘passed’ in order for 
it to be considered as accepted
Vendors: for-profit firms that sell proprietary voting systems to EMBs
Verification: the process of establishing the truth, accuracy or validity of a 
system’s claims of complying with a given set of standards, guidelines and 
requirements, including the correctness of certification findings
Voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT): printed material from an 
electronic voting machine that shows the voter how the machine recognized 
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